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The field of statutory construction saw no new players in
the game during the period covered by this survey, but the old
veteran principles of the past clashed in new and interesting
plays.
Perhaps the most explosive situation presented during the
period occurred in Elliott v. Sligh. An Act of the 1957 Gen-
eral Assembly declared criminal the use, sale or possession of
certain fireworks in any county containing a city of over 65,-
000 population. The Act applied only to Richland and Charles-
ton Counties because of the limitation as to population. The
Court declared the Act violative of Article III, Section 34,
Subdivision IX, of the State Constitution, which prohibits
the enactment of a special law in cases where a general law
can be made applicable. Legislation expressed in general
terms (as this was) but special in its application falls within
the ban. The classification (here based on the population of
the city within the county) must be based upon differences
defined by the Constitution or held by reason of their nature
to justify the diversity in the legislation. The evidence before
the Court indicated that other counties in the State, such as
Greenville, Spartanburg and Anderson, were not any differ-
ent from Richland and Charleston Counties in so far as fire-
works control was concerned.
In another case of considerable public interest, Dean V.
Timmerman,2 the Supreme Court declared invalid the portion
of section 7 of the 1958 General Appropriation Bill which
authorized the issuance of bonds for the construction of sec-
ondary roads selected from a list submitted by the respective
county delegations. The provision was held unconstitutional
as in contravention of Article I, Section 14, of the Constitu-
tion as an encroachment upon the powers of the executive
branch. Upon the basis of its holding in the leading case of
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Bramlette v. Stringer,8 and in due deference to the principle
of stare decisis, the Court said that the legislative delegations
should stay away from such matters and leave them to the
executive branch. The Court went on to say that, pursuant to
the established principle of partial unconstitutionality, the re-
maining portion of the section involved, which imposed an ex-
tra cent of tax on gasoline, should be permitted to stand since
to do so would further the legislative intent expressed in the
Act.
In perhaps the most difficult of the cases in the field, Colo-
nial Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. South Carolina Tax
Commission,4 the Supreme Court considered at length the
meaning of a 1950 Act imposing a tax of four and one-half
per cent on "investment income" of certain insurance com-
panies. Before reaching the merits the Court disposed of a
contention relating to the contents of the record and a claim
that the Act was invalid because the effect of it was not ex-
pressed in its title as required by Article III, Section 17, of
the Constitution. The Court held, as to the title difficulty, that
the title was defective but that the defect was cured because
the Act had been incorporated into the 1952 Code in accor-
dance with law. As to the interpretation of the statute itself,
the Court stated that as a taxing statute it is not to be ex-
tended beyond the clear import of its language and any sub-
stantial doubt as to meaning should be resolved in favor of
the taxpayer.5 The Court also said that if the legislative in-
tent is clear from the language, there is no occasion to resort
to the rules of statutory construction.6 Applying those princi-
ples, the Court said that "personal property" was not limited
to tangible personal property but included intangible items
such as shares or deposits in building and loan associations.
Further, said the Court, such intangibles were "situated" at
the domicile of the owner and therefore subject to tax, since
the Legislature had used that word to mean taxable situs
rather than physical location.
3. 186 S. C. 134, 195 S. E. 267 (1938).
4. 233 S. C. 129, 103 S. E. 2d 908 (1958).
5. Beard v. S. C. Tax Commission, 230 S. C. 357, 95 S. E. 2d 628
(1957).
6. Crescent Manufacturing Co. v. S. C. Tax Commission, 129 S. C. 480,
124 S. E. 761 (1924).
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In the only other case decided during the period, State v.
National Postal Transport Association,7 the Court bolstered its
decision that a foreign insurance company doing business as
a fraternal benefit association was not subject to a penalty
of ten dollars per day for failing to register as a foreign cor-
poration by mentioning that the Secretary of State had appar-
ently construed the penalty as inapplicable to the company
for twenty years or more. Interestingly enough, in the Co-
lonial Life case, supra, in which the Tax Commission changed
its views after four years, the Court said that the Tax Com-
mission could well have been wrong the whole time.
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